< Previousare a vehicle for tailoring interventions to defendants’ criminogenic needs and thereby reserve prosecutorial, judicial, and correctional resources for more serious cases. Research shows that such programs are becoming a more central element within efforts to reduce the size of the prison population and may reduce recidivism among program completers (Chisholm & Altenburg, 2017; Loong et al., 2019; Lowder et al., 2018; Pfaff, 2017). However, some studies show that diversionary programs can tether individuals to the justice system and increase disparities in outcomes by necessitating prolonged programmatic commitments and increased financial obligations (Adamson, 2020; Epperson et al., 2022; Shannon et al., 2020; see also Pager et al., 2022). District Attorney Offices (DAOs) commonly serve as gatekeepers to front-end diversionary opportunities by reviewing and approving cases for initial referral and advising judges as to the conditions, or requirements, for participation (Johnson et al., 2020; Wright & Levine, 2021). In some cases, the DAO may be the sole, discretionary gatekeeper for admission—and for this reason they are often referred to as “prosecutor-led diversion programs” (Epperson et al., 2022). In this model, eligible defendants, typically those with non-violent offenses and limited criminal histories can accept a referral, but in doing so may be required to plead guilty or no contest to the current charges, with the prospect of dismissal or expungement upon completion. The conditions associated with participating in diversionary programs vary by court, case, and defendant. They commonly include time under community supervision (and, often, associated time-based fees throughout the term of supervision), community service, repayment of court fines and fees, substance abuse assessments, treatment programs, and educational classes. Once the conditions of community supervision and diversion are satisfied (i.e., costs paid, programs/classes completed, community supervision time elapsed), defendants’ charges are typically dismissed, or records expunged, freeing them from the potential collateral consequences of a criminal record (Prescott & Starr, 2020; Selbin et al., 2018; Yee, 2017). Defendants who fail to complete front-end diversion, however, may find themselves in “legal limbo”—no longer under court or community supervision, and with no final disposition, charge dismissal, or record expungement (Johnson et al., 2020). Program Fees and Diversion in Philadelphia—A Closer Look In the front-end diversion context, program fees may uniquely contribute to the host of adverse outcomes of LFOs in ways that are less obvious, including through reduced program or treatment enrollment. This potentially additive impact has serious implications for defendants when program completion is linked to charge dismissal or record expungement. Failure to pay these costs may keep defendants tethered to or further entrenched in the criminal legal system, even when all other conditions of diversion are satisfied. Below we characterize these potential outcomes using preliminary data from Philadelphia’s Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program. ARD is a useful context to explore the interplay between program costs and diversion because it has the core elements of the “typical” pretrial diversion program: a prosecutorial-led referral process, close coordination with a community supervision agency, an emphasis on rehabilitation, and the prospect of expungement for the current charge upon program completion. When a person is charged with an offense in Philadelphia, the DAO reviews the case and determines eligibility for one of two ARD tracks: standard (misdemeanor or felony) or driving under the influence (DUI). Generally, ARD is offered to those defendants “with a recent history of non-violent prior arrests and a limited number of convictions” (City of Philadelphia, n.d.). Defendants who accept the ARD offer and complete their pre-enrollment tasks then have their case reviewed by the judge during a status hearing for determining program acceptance. Once accepted, defendants must comply with a series of conditions while under community supervision for a period of between six months and two years depending on the charge. These conditions typically include community service hours and paying fines and fees. Those in the ARD-DUI track are also required to complete substance use assessments, treatment, education, and oftentimes drug testing. When all conditions are satisfied, the Adult Probation and Parole Department (APPD) informs the DAO, and the DAO makes a recommendation to the judge for program completion and ultimately, expungement. Figure 1 depicts the typical flow of cases through ARD enrollment and completion. As the literature on implementation science would suggest, program eligibility, enrollment, and completion criteria are subject to a range of pragmatic and other influences that can result in low implementation fidelity (Carroll et al., 2007). In reality, any number of barriers exist at each of these stages. Some are obvious and intentional (e.g., crime type or severity barring people from eligibility), while others may be less apparent and unintentional. These latter barriers, when unexamined, may result in the systemic exclusion of certain groups or classes of people and runs the risk of exacerbating, or ever creating, differential enrollment rates based on class, race, or another grouping by protected (or policy-relevant) class. 40 PERSPECTIVESVOLUME 47, NUMBER 2 TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES41 AMERICAN PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES Limited prior research has begun to address the key factors that impede defendant success in diversion programming. For example, as part of the Safety and Justice Challenge (SJC) initiative,1 a Diversion Workgroup funded through the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation tracked a subset of cases in Philadelphia in the 2018-2019 time period to uncover the reasons why individuals fail ARD diversion in Philadelphia. Drawing on a range of data from the DAO, court, and APPD records, staff surveys, and program documentation, a key finding became clear: the fees associated with front-end diversion (and treatment- related mandates in particular) are a significant barrier to program enrollment and completion. The Diversion Workgroup’s data show that there are three common reasons why defendants do not complete ARD: (1) failure to attend substance abuse class/safe driving school; (2) failure to get a treatment evaluation; and/or (3) failure to get treatment (Diversion Workgroup, 2020). The combined effects of these treatment-related barriers explained 84% of diversion non-completers. Other factors, including new arrests, failure to appear/report, and failure to complete community service hours, explained non-completion in far fewer cases (Diversion Workgroup, 2020). By and large, failure to comply with treatment-related mandates contributes to many defendants failing to complete ARD in Philadelphia and not having their records expunged. The top three reasons for diversion non-completion match findings in the broader literature on community supervision failure suggesting that those mandated to treatment are sometimes noncompliant and that noncompliance may result in higher levels of supervision (e.g., more frequent drug testing or reporting), technical violations, or even the revocation of community supervision (Marlowe, 2003; Rempel & DeStefano, 2019; Skeem et al., 2011). In line with the Diversion Workgroup’s data and that of others (see, e.g., Steinmetz & Henderson, 2016; Tapia & Harris, 2006), supervision failure is also more common among members of communities of color. What drives treatment noncompliance and whether it is another point of entry for racial and ethnic disparities in diversion outcomes remains to be seen. When services are provided by third-party or non-public actors, treatment mandates can be associated with additional costs (e.g., fees, co-pays), which may explain, in part, why they represent such a barrier. To enroll in ARD-DUI one must complete a Court Reporting Network evaluation, which costs $70 and cannot be scheduled without advance payment. Some defendants must also pay for a separate drug and alcohol assessment ($80) before ARD enrollment. Other common costs during post- enrollment supervision include Alcohol Highway Safety School ($165 to $410), independent counseling sessions Arrest Judge approves enrollment2 Time under APPD supervision elapses APPD notifies the court if the conditions of supervision1 are met (e.g. treatment classes, drug testing, community service, fines/fees/restitution) Court indicates the defendent completed ARD and exponges their record3 Eligibility determination by DAO Offer sent by DAO Offer accepted by defendent Pre-enrollment tasks completed by defendant (e.g. substance abuse evaluation(s)1, paperwork accepting conditions) Administrative entry hearing attended by DAO, defense, and judge Offer [~5 to 6 weeks between arrest and offer, ~30 to 60 days between offer and enrollment] [Time under APPD community supervision, ~6 months to 2 years] 1 Area of high attrition associated with LFOs 2 The judge may issue a preliminary rejection for enrollment at their discretion. The defendant may attend a follow- up hearing to request reconsideration. 3 Expungement may be unavailable by statute for certain offenses. Records are not automatically expunged for those satisfying the conditions of supervision after the supervision period has elapsed (including payment of restitution and other LFOs). These individuals can pursue expungement through a separate administrative process.42 PERSPECTIVESVOLUME 47, NUMBER 2 (at $65 each), an American Society of Addiction Medicine assessment ($140), and/or DUI group counseling ($490). The total average cost for ARD participants ranges from about $350 to $700, most of which stems from these treatment-related mandates (Diversion Workgroup, 2020). Financial barriers not only reduce individuals’ likelihood of diversion enrollment and completion, but preliminary data have shown that they may also increase racial and ethnic disparities and place a large burden on those of lower socioeconomic classes. Data from the Diversion Workgroup (2020) show that Black defendants in ARD represented a far smaller proportion of completed diversion cases (roughly 24%) than would be expected given correctional population statistics in Philadelphia. In fact, Black and Latinx people were diverted at less than half the rate of their White counterparts. When enrolled, Black and Latinx defendants took longer and were less likely to complete ARD. Given the totality of their findings, the Diversion Workgroup suggests that “program costs are a consequential barrier—if not the most important barrier—to [ARD] completion and expungement.” To sum up, the design of Philadelphia’s ARD program falls in line with many prosecutor-led diversion programs. Eligible individuals are invited to participate by the DAO and are enrolled and placed under community supervision if they complete certain prerequisites, which often include payment for substance use assessments and other costs. Those who satisfy all conditions of supervision are then recommended for program completion and, if eligible, record expungement. However, the data shared here show that the diversion process can look different in practice. In line with the Diversion Workgroup’s findings, there is evidence that front-end fees may serve as gatekeepers to diversion and perpetuate lower rates of program enrollment, completion, and record expungement. If this is the case, then front-end fees may inadvertently widen the net for continued or deepened justice involvement and its collateral consequences. These patterns are not likely exclusive to diversion in Philadelphia and support our call for more varied and generalizable research—including that which identifies the scope and impacts of front-end LFOs and considers how they may be uniquely harmful to communities of color and those who are unable to pay. Priorities for Research and Program/ Policy Reform Within the community supervision context, research must better account for the range of individuals, both pre- and post-sentencing, who may be under supervision and the different consequences that non-payment of LFOs may create. When considering the impact of LFOs on people within the justice system, efforts to further distinguish front-end from back-end LFOs should be undertaken, especially to highlight how they may uniquely burden individuals and communities. In Philadelphia, this could include an examination of front-end LFOs and their impacts on low-income communities and communities of color, specifically. Such research would address an imbalance in the diversion literature, which to date has focused primarily on back-end costs (e.g., restitution, back pay for child support, see Roman & Link, 2017) and those that are specifically imposed by courts. As has been shown above, though, the fees attached to substance abuse evaluations, treatment, and classes are assessed by outside service providers and are not necessarily tracked in administrative court or correctional data. This renders them a hidden potential burden that may further marginalize individuals who are already more likely to become (and stay) justice- involved by failing diversion and/or community supervision programming. In considering the nature and impacts of front-end diversion fees, critical fundamental questions remain. For example: (1) when in the diversion process are defendants expected to pay a cost, (2) what does the cost cover, (3) who is assessing the cost, (4) how do people pay these costs, and (5) what are the potential ramifications of non- payment (e.g., return to court for trial, referral to a collection agency)? It is also important to collect detailed data on secondary outcomes relating to racial and ethnic disparities in program enrollment and completion (particularly as they relate to known barriers like program costs), as well as social and legal outcomes that extend beyond recidivism (e.g., debt collections, child support payments). There is a great need for the collection of detailed process data to understand how and why individuals move—or don’t move—through the diversion process. From these data, we could identify the points when case attrition is the most likely and address these areas to improve enrollment and completion rates and better achieve the goals of diversion. The Diversion Workgroup (2020) provided an excellent example of improved data collection in the ARD context (e.g., staff from DAO’s Diversion Unit now track the reasons why individuals are not recommended for the program), but more data are needed, including the collection of detailed information from non-court stakeholders such as service providers and community supervision agencies. This latter need is especially important in Philadelphia’s diversion context, where the responsibility for ARD fee assessment is diffused across official agencies and service providers. An enhanced capacity for data integration across involved parties will, in turn, enhance research capacity for answering these outstanding questions. TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES43 AMERICAN PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES Developing reforms at the programmatic and jurisdictional levels should follow efforts to improve data collection. If diversionary costs impede enrollment, delay or prevent program completion and expungement, and contribute to racial and ethnic disparities, then programs should take stock of and reevaluate their current policies and practices. The Diversion Workgroup asks how programs might intervene earlier in the process, prior to defendants landing in “legal purgatory” (i.e., when all diversion conditions except LFOs are met, preventing program completion and expungement on the account of non-payment alone). It also considers what might be needed to generalize findings from one program (e.g., ARD) to other front-end diversionary programs, suggesting that rigorous process and outcome evaluations take priority. Perhaps most intriguing, it asks whether there is a need, and an avenue, to abolish the costs to defendants that are associated with diversion programs. Conclusions Front-end diversionary programs are a key element of a broader strategy to reduce correctional populations, racial/ethnic disparities, and the number of low-risk and non-violent individuals who are incarcerated (Chisholm & Altenburg, 2017; Loong et al., 2019; Lowder et al., 2018; Pfaff, 2017). However, participation in these programs may come with hidden financial costs, which vary depending on many factors including participation in diversionary programming and treatment (Adamson, 2020; Pager et al., 2022; Shannon et al., 2020). Preliminary data from Philadelphia support that the LFOs associated with front- end diversion, and treatment mandates in particular, may impact program enrollment and completion (Diversion Workgroup, 2020). These costs are often assessed by outside service providers and therefore have remained “under the radar” of researchers and policymakers who use administrative data to support policy decisions. Defendants who are unable to pay these types of costs are less likely to find success in diversion and may become trapped in the justice system or stuck in “legal limbo.” This is an understudied area that has important implications for community supervision policy and research, diversionary program enrollment and completion rates, and efforts to reduce unwarranted disparities. More detailed process and outcome data specific to front-end diversion programs, LFOs, and their implications for successful completion of community supervision are needed. Acknowledgements The drafting of this paper was generously supported with a grant from Arnold Ventures. References Adamson, B. L. (2020). Debt bondage: How private collection agencies keep the formerly incarcerated tethered to the criminal justice system. Northwestern Law Journal of Law and Social Policy, 15, 305-337. https:// scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp/vol15/iss3/2 Bannon, A, Nagrecha, M and Diller, R. (2010). 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Annual Review of Criminology, 4, 331-351. Yee, M. J. (2017). Expungement law: An extraordinary remedy for an extraordinary harm. Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y, 25, 169-192.45 AMERICAN PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES Connecting Top Employers with Premiere Professionals! Employers https://careers.appa-net.org Professionals The APPA Career Center provides all the functionality and reach of contemporary job boards while specifically focusing on the Community Corrections industry. *To receive these member benefits, login with your company’s primary APPA contact email. PLACE your job in front of qualified professionals. SEARCH our Resume Bank using robust filters to narrow your candidate search. UTILIZE our job posting and Job FlashTM email packages to earn greater visibility. Bonus for those with Agency or Corporate APPA Membership!* RECEIVE discounted rates on job posting packages! 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